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considered central to preventing the transmission of the average price per sex act, they follow an instrumental
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1. Introduction
Prostitution is often described as the world's oldest profession yet economists have almost never
studied it. The neglect of this important market is particularly glaring in the face of the AIDS epidemic
and the consensus that commercially purchased sex is central to the spread of the disease in the
developing world (World Bank 1997, Jain et. al., 1994). More than 90 per cent of all adult HIV
infections are in developing countries and the vast majority of these cases were contracted from
heterosexual sex with an infected partner. To date, AIDS has had the greatest impact in Africa where it
is estimated that over 2.5 percent of adults have been infected with the disease. Now, however, the
disease is thought to be widespread in South Asia where the first case was reported in 1986. Experts
believe that without drastic measures South Asia may suffer effects as devastating as those observed in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Promoting the use of condoms and other safe sex practices among sex workers is known to be
perhaps the most effective method of preventing the spread of the epidemic in the developing world. In
India as in most other developing countries, however, men have a strong preference against using
condoms. One indicator of this is that despite many decades of extensive government sponsored "family
planning" campaigns promoting their use, condoms have not become a commonly used method of
contraception. Recent data from a nationally representative sample show, for instance, that only 7% of
married couples use condoms, with female sterilization being the most widely used method of
contraception (27 per cent), followed by abstinence and other traditional methods (20 per centV. This
inherent resistance to using condoms is compounded by a lack of awareness about HIV/AlDS and safe
sex practices in the general population2. Consequently sex workers who want to practice safe sex
potentially face losing a considerable amount of income by doing so. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
sex workers could face at least a fifty percent loss in income by practicing safe sex (Bhave et. al, 1995).
There are, however, no direct estimates of the size of this disincentive for safe sex.
If effective policies to combat AIDS are to be devised it is, thus, very important to have some
knowledge of the size of the compensating differential faced by sex workers who want to use condoms.
If the income loss is large, this suggests that HIV/AIDS interventions among sex workers may need to
' International Institute of Population Studies, National Family and Health Survey (NFHS), (1992-93).
2 The NFHS also found that only 36 per cent had heard of AIDS in 1993 (NFHS, 1993). A much smaller proportion
were likely to have heard of HIV the virus that causes AIDS and therefore of the best methods of preventing it -
though these questions were not asked in the NFHS survey. Another survey did ask more detailed questions and
found that though 35 per cent had heard of AIDS only 4 per cent were aware of the HIV virus and of measures to
prevent its transmission (Gupta and Mitra, 1998). A third survey of people attending an STD clinic in 1993-94, who
would be expected to be more aware of STDs than the general population, found that only 14 per cent knew that
condoms were effective in preventing HIV transmission (Grover et.al. xx).
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find ways of providing compensation for lowered earnings while actively educating clients about the
dangers of not using condoms. However, as the client population becomes aware and concerned about
the risks of contracting AIDS and thus more receptive to using condoms, this compensating differential
should wither away and may even become positive.
Despite the importance of the topic, the literature on the economics of prostitution is sparse.
Ahlburg and Jensen (1998) in a recent summary of the literature on the commercial sex industry and its
implications for HIV/AIDS prevention policies, show that there is a total absence of econometric work.
The primary reason for this is the extreme difficulty in gathering reliable data on sex workers since the
profession is practiced either illegally or, as in the case of Calcutta - the focus of our paper - on the fringes
of legality. While there is a lack of work by economists on sex work, there is a large and growing
economics literature on the AIDS epidemic more generally, which has dealt with it from different angles.
Some studies have attempted to estimate the macroeconomic impact of the epidemic finding that it is
likely to be small (Over 1992), while others have attempted to look broadly at what rational choice
analysis can say about the progression of the epidemic (Philipson and Posner, 1995). Kremer (1996) in a
theoretical paper examines AIDS transmission in a dynamic model and shows that the prevalence of
AIDS would lead people with low levels of sexual activity to be less active. On the other hand it may
lead high activity people to become "fatalistic" and thus either reduce their activity only slightly or even
increase it. In a mixed population with high and low activity people this creates a positive feedback, by
reducing the number of available partners - resulting in higher risks of infection for high activity people
and low levels of risk for low activity people.
The micro-econometric literature on AIDS has tended to suggest that epidemiological models of
the epidemic may overestimate the speed of its transmission. Ahituv, Hotz and Philipson (1996), for
instance, show that condom use increased among individuals in the United States in a manner consistent
with the progression of the epidemic - supporting the idea that the epidemic may be self-limiting. In a
study of gay men in San Francisco, Dow and Philipson (1996), demonstrate that mating is infection
dependent in that infected men are twice as likely as non-infected men to have infected partners which
would also tend to slow down the progression of the disease. The econometric literature on AIDS in the
developing world is limited and has tended to focus more on assessing its impact rather than on testing
behavioral models (World Bank, 1997).
In this paper we use a unique data set of a random sample of commercial sex workers in Calcutta,
India surveyed in 1993. They were the focus of a program promoting the health of sex workers and safe
sex practices that was initiated in 1992 by the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in
collaboration with various other organizations. We exploit the random nature of selection into this
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program to identify the relationship between the price of sex work and condom use and thus estimate the
compensating differential for safe sex. This instrument allows us to eliminate a serious source of bias
common to estimates of compensating wage differentials - biases introduced by simultaneity and
unobserved productivity (Garen 1988, Hwang, Reed and Hubbard 1992).
In many ways the market for sex work is simply another labor market. Sex workers in the red
light area of Sonagachi in Calcutta who are the focus of this paper are almost always part of a brothel
under the ownership of a madam or pimp. They are required to pay fifty per cent of their earnings as rent
and "protection" to the person controlling the brothel. The market is quite competitive with over 4,000
sex workers working in 3 70 brothels servicing about 20,000 clients a day (AIIH&PH, 1997). Calcutta is
one of the world's largest cities with an estimated population 13 million of which 31 per cent are
migrants. This results in a male dominated sex ratio with 0.83 females for every male in the population
that in turn causes the demand for sex work to be consistent and high. Sonagachi is the oldest and best
established red-light area in Calcutta and has been in existence at least for 150 years. It is located close to
Calcutta University which provides a steady source of clients, and like many other older Calcutta
neighborhoods consists of a dense network of narrow, winding streets lined by two and three story
buildings. The brothels are supported by a number of restaurants, teashops, bars and other businesses
that serve sex workers and their clients in the area.
Sex work is a highly stigmatized activity. Women who enter the profession are rarely able to
participate in mainstream social activities and see themselves as "fallen." In most instances they are cut
off from their families, even though some continue to send them remittances. Children of sex workers
cannot find spouses from mainstream society and have to marry within the community - which is also
indicative of a sex worker's status as an outcaste. In another survey conducted in Sonagachi in 1992, sex
workers were asked the reason why they entered the profession. Table 1 summarizes the responses by
income categories of sex workers showing that the majority of sex workers (49 per cent) became sex
workers because of acute poverty. This includes situations where destitute parents were compelled by
circumstances sell their daughters to pimps or their agents, or where widowed women are forced into it to
subsist after the death of their husbands. In an ethnographic study of Sonagachi, Sleightholme and Sinha
(1997) suggest that a large number of women enter the profession in order to escape violent husbands, or
to support themselves after being abandoned by their husbands. This is substantiated in Table 1 that
reports results from an earlier survey of Sonagachi conducted in 19923. It shows that 1.6 per cent of
women entered the profession because of family disputes. Despite the highly stigmatized nature of the
3 We have not been able to obtain these data and are therefore unable to further analyze them.
S
profession, 8.7 per cent enter it Voluntarily. This is- because it is a lucrative occupation relative to the
rather low earnings potential of other professions open to poorer Indian women.
As in other markets, sex workers are compensated on the basis of their attributes, the services
they provide and the demand for those attributes and services. Vaginal sex is the most typical service
provided and is practiced in almost all the transactions. Oral and group sex are also prevalent, while anal
sex is practically non-existent. While rates are to some extent determined by negotiation, the market is
large and competitive and there is a good sense of the "correct" wage or price with differences arising
from the sex workers age, physical attributes and her level of education. A sex worker gets to keep about
fifty per cent of her earnings, with the rest taken by the madam or pimp.
Methodology
One can think of prices for sex work as being determined by a hedonic function relating the price
to a set of characteristics.
P=P(2, C) (1)
Where P denotes the average rate per act charged by the sex worker, X is a vector of attributes of the sex
worker, and C is a variable denoted whether the sex worker practices safe sex, specifically whether her
clients always use condoms.
As in any implicit market this function is affected by both demand and supply factors. Estimates
of the impact of any characteristic on the price has to be thought of as the result of an equilibrating
process. If clients have a strong preference against using condoms (Bhave 1995, Sleightholme & Sinha
1997) and sex workers would like to have condom using clients in order to protect themselves from the
AIDS virus, then the theory of equalizing differences (Rosen, 1986) suggests that we should observe a
negative relationship between condom use and the average price charged by the sex worker. The actual
compensating differential would reflect the point at which the market reaches equilibrium given the
attributes, income and preferences of sex workers and clients. Estimating such compensating
differentials, however, is not a straightforward exercise and problems of unobserved heterogeneity can
cause serious biases in the estimates. Hwang, Reed and Hubbard (1992) point out that unobserved
productivity, even if it is not correlated with observed measures of productivity, can cause a large positive
bias in estimates of the compensating differential. This is because workers with higher values of the
unobserved attribute are more likely to have greater earnings as well as more likely to choose less risky
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job attributes, since both are normal goods. Consequently, estimates of the hedonic wage equation will be
biased in a direction opposite to the (true) compensating differential. Various approaches have been
employed to deal with the problem, including the use of panel data (Duncan and Holmlund, 1983) and
instrumental variables (Garen, 1988). While we lack panel data, participation in the safe sex training
program provides us with a valuable instrumental variable that is able to correct the bias inherent in OLS
estimates of effect of condom use on wages of sex work.
In September, 1992 the All India Institute of Public Health and Hygiene began a program in
Sonagachi that attempted to provide basic health care facilities to sex workers and their families in
Sonagachi while also educating them about HIV/AIDS and the methods to aid in its prevention. The
HIV/AIDS information was communicated in a manner that proved to be both innovative and effective.
Initially, a group of twelve sex workers were recruited to become peer educators. They were given
intensive training on AIDS and other aspects of health care, provided with green coats to identify them as
medical workers, and sent into the community to promote safe sex practices. The primary tool they
employed for this purpose was a flip chart that used a series of pictures to explain the nature and
progression of the HIV virus, its effect on the human immune system, and how the use of condoms was
the most effective method of preventing the disease. They also carried condoms with them to distribute
to the sex workers free of cost while demonstrating their proper use. Sex workers who wished to use
condoms, subsequent to meeting the peer educator could pick them up for free from nearby locations, thus
condoms were available in unlimited supply at zero cost.
The peer educators would contact about 40 to 50 sex workers every day and by the time the
survey was conducted in 1993 about 53 per cent of them had been contacted in this manner. It is
important to note that those who were contacted were not selected on the basis of their income, age,
schooling, or any other characteristic: the peer educators would simply target a set of brothels in an area
of Sonagachi and move on to another area the next day4. Thus, while the selection was not random in a
technical sense, it was also not systematically related to any observed or unobserved attributes relevant to
this analysis.
Prior to this contact with the peer educators, even if the sex workers had heard of AIDS most did
not have any detailed knowledge of the disease or a sense of how safe sex practices could prevent its
transmission. Thus flip charts represented the first time that most the sex workers were receiving accurate
and complete information on AIDS. Since the flip charts were not administered in a systematic manner
4 The brothels are not located in a systematic pattern. Each street in Sonagachi has a mix of "high-class" and "low -
class" establishments that sometimes co-exist within the same building.
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and were effective tools in encouraging safe sex while providing sex workers with access to free
condoms, they can be potentially used to identify the compensating differential for condom use.
We can posit the existence of an equation determining whether a sex worker always uses
condoms:
C=C(X, S) (2)
where C is a binary variable denoting condom use, X is the vector of sex worker characteristics, and S is a
dummy indicating if the sex worker has seen the flip chart. We will estimate (2) and (1) simultaneously
using instrumental variables to get unbiased and consistent estimates of the impact of condom use on
income. In particular, it helps deal with an important type of unobserved heterogeneity in this market -
the sex worker's physical attractiveness which will bias the estimate of the impact of condom use on
income if condom use is not instrumented. Physical attractiveness is perhaps the most important attribute
in determining earnings from sex work and is also very difficult to measure. Since it is not measured,
estimates of the impact of condom use on sex worker wages can be seriously biased because sex workers
who are relatively attractive and consequently have a high demand for their services may also be more
willing to "purchase" safe sex by using condoms. However, their earnings would remain high relative to
the rest of the population. This would cause condom use to show a positive correlation with the average
rate per act, which is a problem similar to the bias caused by unobserved productivity on estimates of
compensating differentials in other labor markets (Hwang, Reed and Hubbard, 1992). While any such
unobserved heterogeneity is a potential problem in OLS estimates of prices, so long as the excluded
variable - contact with a peer educator - is not correlated with the source of unobserved heterogeneity,
condom use can be instrumented to correct for the bias.
As explained above the data for this analysis are from a random sample of 612 sex workers in
Sonagachi from a survey conducted in 1993. The sex workers were surveyed by a team social workers
under the supervision of the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health (AIIH&PH). AIIH&PH had
a presence in Sonagachi for more than a year at the time of the survey and were therefore able to establish
an excellent rapport with the sex workers and thus elicit accurate responses5. While the survey
instrument was primarily focussed on medical evaluations, a number of socio-economic questions were
also asked. It should be noted that there are two main limitations in the survey from the perspective of
estimating compensating differentials. Clients were not surveyed, which prevents us from saying
anything about the demand side of the market, and questions on prices were not based upon different
See the AIIH&PH report (1997) for more details.
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types of service but on the average price charged per act. Therefore, while we know the average price
charged by a sex worker we do not have direct information about how this changed if the sex worker used
condoms or varied the type of service offered.
For the vector X denoting sex worker characteristics we will include her education - divided into
three categories for primary school (4 t0), middle school (7 th) and high school and above ( I th). We will
also include the sex workers age in years, her tenure in the profession in months, whether she was married
before coming into the profession, the number of children she has, and whether she has had a tubal
ligation6. For the condom use variable C we will use a binary classification asking if she always uses
condoms or not, and S which is excluded from the price equation is also a binary variable denoting
whether the sex worker has seen the flip chart. Thus, we will estimate the impact of always using
condoms on a sex worker's average wage per act.
Results
The sex workers in Sonagachi are reputed to be the most prosperous in Calcutta but Figure 1,
which provides a diagram of the kernel density estimate of the average rate per act, shows that they are a
highly heterogeneous group with a wide variation in their earnings. The median price charged is forty
rupees, but the average price charged by a sex worker range from a minimum of Rs. 15 to a maximum of
Rs. 600 per act7 . Ninety per cent of the sex workers charge less than Rs.100, and 25 per cent charge less
than 30 rupees. This heterogeneity is also reflected in sex worker characteristics that have been
summarized in Table 2. The average age is 23 with sex workers ranging in age from fourteen to fifty.
About 21 per cent of them have had some schooling and they have spent an average in sex work with 19
being the average age of entry into the profession. On average a sex worker has 0.6 children with about
20 per cent of them having been married before entering the profession. The female sterilization rate is
about ten per cent, and about 42 per cent of them were medically treated in previous month. Finally, note
that 47 per cent of the sex workers always use condoms and 54 per cent have been targeted by the peer
educators and have seen the flip chart.
Table 4 presents results from a probit regression of the determinants of condom use. Firstly, note
that controlling for all the X variables, sex workers who have encountered a peer educator are about 12
per cent more likely to always use condoms. Sex workers who have been to the AIIPH&H clinic for
medical treatment are about 7 per cent more likely to use condoms, though this is not significant at the 5
6 Note that since physical attractiveness is not likely to be correlated with education and therefore its omission is not
likely to bias the education effects.
7There are 4 outlying average rates that exceed 210 rupees that are omitted from the analysis.
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per cent level. Condom use is also is higher among younger sex workers and, and to an extent, among the
better educated since sex workers with a middle school education are 16 per cent more likely to use
condoms than uneducated sex workers. Neither female sterilization nor number of children significantly
affects condom use suggesting that condoms are not used as contraceptives.
Table 3 present OLS estimates of the log of the average rate per act. The first regression
estimates a structural equation with condom use included as a right-hand side variable. The OLS results
show that condom use has a positive but non-significant coefficient. The second regression estimates a
reduced form log rate equation which excludes the condom use variable but includes the flip chart
dummy. This regression shows that sex workers who have seen the flip chart have wages that are 18 per
cent lower than those who have not seen the flip chart. Since sex workers were exposed to the flip chart
in a relatively random manner, this indicates that exposure to the flip chart caused a change in behavior
that resulted in lower wages. Since, the flip chart also increased condom use the mechanism driving this
loss in income may be that sex workers who were better informer about HIV/AIDS preferred to use
condoms even at the expense of a loss in income.
The second regression in Table 4 estimates the structural equation for the log rate with the
instrumented condom use variable. Here we see that the condom use, which is significant at the 5 per
cent level, reduces the average rate per act by about 79 per cent. While this suggests a very large
compensating differential it is not all that unrealistic considering the 50 per cent loss income indicated by
anecdotal evidence from sex workers in Bombay (Bhave et. al, 1995). Even if the estimate is biased
downward it does clearly indicate that sex workers can face large losses in income by using condoms and
this should be taken into consideration by any intervention that tries to introduce safe sex practices into
sex worker communities.
The other variables have predictable but interesting effects on rates. Unlike other labor markets, age
is negatively related to income with every year of age reducing the average wage earned by 2.5 per cent.
Note, however, that experience does not have a significant effect suggesting that the job-specific skills are
not very important9. It is interesting to note that sex workers have large and significant returns to
schooling. Sex workers with primary schooling do not make significantly more than uneducated sex
workers, but those who have completed middle and high school make about 50 per cent more. This may
be because clients and sex workers sort assortatively with more educated clients preferring better
educated sex workers and paying more for their services. Also note that sex workers who were married
before entering the profession make about 25 per cent less. This suggests a selection effect. Married
s Age did not have any quadratic effects in these data and therefore only the linear specification is reported.
9While experience does not affect earnings, it may matter more in coping with the harsh realities of life in the red
light area.
lO
women are among those who have forced into prostitution by circumstances, while unmarried women
were more likely to have been induced into joining the profession because of their ability to command a
high price in the market.
To summarize the main findings in this paper, we have attempted to estimate the compensating
differential for condom use for a sample of sex workers in Calcutta from 1993. An intervention program
was instituted in 1992 which brought sex workers into contact with peer educators who instructed them
about AIDS and safe sex practices, and was administered in a non-systematic manner. By 1993 fifty
three per cent of the sex workers had come into contact with a peer educator. This is used to instrument a
sex workers probability of always using condoms and thus identify the impact of condom use on earnings.
We find that condom use can result in a 79 per cent loss in the average price per act. In order to institute
effective interventions among sex workers it is crucial that this fact be taken into consideration.
The policy implications of this finding are quite important. If the economic disincentives to practice
safe sex are as large as estimated here, HIV-AIDS interventions in populations where AIDS awareness is
will face serious problems in promoting safe sex among sex workers - particularly in the initial years.
Thus, any interventions should focus on simultaneously promoting safe sex practices among potential
clients as well as sex workers. Some thought may also be given to the fact that sex workers may suffer
large economic losses during the initial years of the intervention. This could be circumvented either by
direct compensation or by a large scale program which results in a quick increase in condom use so that
competition between sex workers does not drive down the price of safe sex. There are a number of open
questions that remain. Does the disincentive for safe sex disappear as the intervention program matures?
Do earnings of sex workers, in fact, increase as they are perceived as being "safer." These questions will
be addresses in future work.
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Table 1
Reasons for Entering Sex Work by Average Rate Category - (Prices in 1993 Rupees)
(Source: AIIH&PH, A Dream, A Pledge, A Fulfillment: Five Year Stint at Sonagachi 1992-1997,
Calcutta, 1997)
Reasons [>-Rs.110 Rs. 55 - Rs.110 <Rs.55 | All Categories
% Acute poverty 39.5 60.8 38.8 49.1
% Voluntarily joined 9.9 4.8 13.1 8.7
% Family dispute 21.0 19.1 25.0 21.6
% Tricked into joining 23.5 10.0 18.8 15.6
% Traditional Sex Workers 6.2 4.3 4.4 4.7
% Kidnapped 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4
Total in category 81 (100 %) 207 (100%) 160 (100%) 448 (100%)
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
Average Rate Per Act - 1993 Rupees 49.936 32.457
Age 23.273 5.576
Months in Sonagachi 47.235
Primary School (4nf Grade) 0.031
Completed Middle School (7th Grade) 0.123
Completed High School (1 0n Grade) 0.054
Married Before coming to Sonagachi 0.192
Number of Children 0.631 0.860
Sterilized 0.102
Medically Treated Last Month 0.424
Seen Flip Chart 0.53 5
Always Uses Condoms 0.473
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Kernel Density of Real Rate Per Act
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.02 -
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Table 3
(Standard Errors are Heteroskedasticity Corrected)
Variable Log Average Rate Log Average Rate Log Average Rate
(N=608) Per Act Per Act Per Act
- Structural OLS - Reduced Form OLS - IV
Coefficient itt Coefficient Itt Coefficient Itt
Age -0.0094 2.2 -0.0103 2.5 -0.0251 2.1
Years in Profession 0.0003 0.7 0.0006 1.4 0.0014 1.4
High School (10+) 0.3198 3.9 0.3218 4.0 0.4717 2.2
Middle School (7'n Grade) 0.3029 4.5 0.2894 4.1 0.5346 3.6
Primary School (4n Grade) 0.0217 0.2 0.0671 0.7 0.1963 0.8
Married -0.1904 5.0 -0.1183 2.9 -0.2458 2.5
Number of Children 0.0299 IA 0.0156 0.6 0.0436 0.8
Sterilized -0.0413 0.6 -0.0138 0.2 -0.1649 1.2
Medically Treated Last Month -0.0555 1.4 -0.0603 1.6 -0.0498 0.5
Seen Flip Chart --- -- -0.1799 4.0 --- --
Condom Always Used 0.0520 1.3 --- --
Condom Always Used - IV --- -- --- -- -1.5845 2.1
Constant 3.9338 43.7 4.0569 45.9 4.9483 9.9
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Table 4
(Standard Errors are Heteroskedasticity Corrected)
Variable Seen Flip Chart Condoms Always Used
(N=608) (Probit) (Probit)
Partial IzI Partial IzI
Derivative Derivative
Age -0.0030 0.1 -0.0097 1.8
Years in Profession 0.0016 3.0 0.0006 1.2
High School (10+) -0.0441 0.4 0.1132 1.2
Middle School (7t" Grade) -0.1147 1.7 0.1560 2.5
Primary School (4n Grade) 0.3273 2.2 0.0876 0.7
Married 0.5549 7.9 -0.0895 1.6
Number of Children -0.1015 3.3 0.0175 0.6
Sterilized 0.2109 2.8 -0.0970 1.3
Medically Treated Last Month -0.0499 1.2 0.0740 1.8
Seen Flip Chart --- --- 0.1122 2.5
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Table 6: Marginal rate of return to education for women in India
Author Year Region Rate of return
Kingdon 19961 Urban Uttar Pradesh 4.9
Tilak 1990 Andhra Pradesh 3.6
Duraisamy 1988 Rural Tamnil Nadu 0.8
Source: Kingdon (1996).
Notes: ' Specification with parental background.
Table 7: Returns to education by level
Level of education Kingdon Unni
(Urban Uttar Pradesh) (Urban Tamil Nadu)
Primary -3.2 0.0
Junior 13.4 11.5
Secondary 20.8 20.0
Higher 14.0 27.0
18
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